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Grey Market Imports and the International Location
of Manufacturing
Benjamin L Cohen*
Manufacturers have frequently used independent dealers to dis-
tribute their products, assigning to each dealer an exclusive geo-
graphic area. A dealer may seek to maintain a minimum price in its
area. Occasionally, however, an ultimate consumer residing in one
distributor's territory buys goods from another distributor at a lower
price. The proliferation of such "transshipments" has led to efforts
either by the former distributor or by the manufacturer to prevent
distribution across territorial lines. These efforts have in turn led to
litigation under the antitrust laws, following attempts by manufactur-
ers to "discipline" offending distributors,' and to legislation in the
form of "fair trade" laws. 2
Several recent judicial and administrative decisions have forced
both the courts and the President to confront the problems posed by
transshipments in the international context and to decide under what
circumstances, if any, the United States should prohibit the trans-
shipment of goods from other countries into the United States.
These international transshipments are called "grey market" im-
ports. Part I of this article summarizes the current case law. Part II
reviews the development of the pertinent legislation and judicial de-
cisions concerning "grey market" imports. Part III presents an eco-
nomic analysis of the roles U.S. customs law might play in this area.
* Ph.D. Harvard University; J.D. Yale University. The author is an attorney in the
Division of International Antitrust, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission.
This article reflects only his personal views and does not constitute the views of the Com-
mission or of any individual Commissioner.
I See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) (terminated
dealer must present evidence other than complaints from other dealers to show that termi-
nation was pursuant to an illegal agreement between manufacturer and other dealers);
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (legality of terminating a dealer
should be judged under "rule of reason" when nonprice restriction is involved); United
States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (collaboration of some Chevrolet dealers
and General Motors to enforce agreement that Chevrolet dealers would not deal with dis-
counters violates Sherman Act); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911) (agreements between a manufacturer and its wholesalers and retailers that
specify minimum prices at which latter may sell violate both common law and Sherman
Act).
2 See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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Part IV reviews the evolving legislative approach to transshipments
within the United States. Part V argues that banning grey market
imports will encourage manufacturing to locate in foreign countries
and concludes that the U.S. government should adopt the same neu-
tral stance towards international transshipments that it has adopted
towards domestic transshipments. This stance would force manufac-
turers and dealers to rely on private contract and tort actions to con-
trol all transshipments.
I. Recent Case Law
Recent administrative and judicial decisions illustrate the differ-
ent fact patterns in which attempts to ban imports of genuine trade-
marked goods can occur. El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World,3
for example, involved an effort by a U.S. company, El Greco Leather
Products Co. (El Greco), to enjoin Shoe World, a chain of 92 retail
shoe stores, from importing shoes that were manufactured in Brazil
by an independent Brazilian company bearing El Greco's U.S. trade-
mark, "CANDIES." The dispute arose when El Greco refused to
accept certain shipments of Brazilian-made shoes. Some of the
shoes in these shipments were authorized to bear the "CANDIES"
trademark by El Greco's Brazilian agent. Shoe World purchased the
rejected shoes from a Brazilian firm and sold them in the United
States. 4 The court denied El Greco's motion for an injunction
prohibiting sales of the shoes in the United States, holding that sec-
tion 526 of the Tariff Act of 19305 did not apply because El Greco
had not purchased its trademark from a foreigner. 6
In Certain Alkaline Batteries7 a U.S. battery manufacturer sought
an order banning importation of batteries bearing its trademark that
were manufactured by a foreign wholly owned subsidiary. Duracell
3 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
4 Id. at 1384.
5 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526
(1982)). Section 526 provides, in pertinent part:
[Ilt shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptable, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a cor-
poration or association created or organized within, the United States, and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the
United States, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title 15, and if a
copy of the certificate of registration of such trademark is filed with the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in section 106 of said Title
15, unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the
time of making entry.
6 El Greco Leather Products Co., 599 F. Supp. at 1401. See also Parfums Stern, Inc. v.
United State Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (U.S. importer financially
linked to foreign manufacturer cannot bar imports of perfume).
7 Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, disapproved by President Reagan
pursuant to 19 7.S.C. § 133 7(g) (1982), 50 Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
862, appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Duracell].
1986] MANUFACTURING LOCATION
Inc. (Duracell US), a Delaware corporation, manufactured batteries
in the United States bearing its U.S. registered Duracell trademark.
Duracell US had a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, Duracell Interna-
tional, which, in turn, owned all of the Belgian corporation, N.V.
Duracell S.A. (Duracell Belgium). Duracell Belgium manufactured
batteries in Belgium with the Belgian-registered Duracell trademark
owned by Duracell International.8 Duracell US, invoking 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337, 9 sought an order banning imports of foreign Duracell batter-
ies. The International Trade Commission (ITC) unanimously held
that although the foreign batteries were not inferior to domestic bat-
teries, the importation of foreign batteries violated 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337.10 Three Commissioners also found a violation of section 42
of the Lanham Act."l These three ITC Commissioners ordered that
all foreign Duracell batteries be excluded from the United States.
Two ITC Commissioners dissented concluding that there should be
an exclusion of only those foreign Duracell batteries that did not
have labels clearly indicating that Duracell US did not sponsor, au-
thorize, or guarantee them when sold in the United States.' 2 The
President, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 13 3 7 (g)(2), then disapproved the
ITC's determination.13 The appeal by Duracell was dismissed. 14
President Reagan, in rejecting the ITC recommendation, 15 said
that the ITC finding of a violation conflicted with recent decisions by
8 Id. at 825.
9 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or
monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful.
10 Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 824.
1 1 Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 42, 60 Stat. 440 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1124
(1982)). Section 42 provides in pertinent part:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name
of the [sic] any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any
manufacturer or trader located in any foreign country which, by treaty, con-
vention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or
which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce
the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or
that it is manufactured in any foreign country or locality other than the coun-
try or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at
any customhouse of the United States.
12 These two ITC Commissioners found no violation of either § 42 of the Lanham
Act or § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and based liability only on violations of § 32(1) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982), and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, id.
§§ 1452-1453.
13 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (1985).
14 Duracell, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comman, 778 F.2d at 1578.
1'5 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (1985).
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the United States District Court for the District of Columbia' 6 and
the Court of International Trade. 17 Both courts upheld the validity
of Customs regulations, issued under section 42 of the Lanham Act
and section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, permitting such imports.',
These regulations' 9 prohibit a person other than the owner of the
U.S. trademark from importing foreign manufactured articles bear-
ing a genuine trademark when the foreign trademark and the U.S.
trademark are not owned by the same person or firm or by persons
or firms subject to "common ownership or control." 20 Because
Duracell US and Duracell Belgium are under common ownership or
control, the regulations permit anyone to import Duracell Belgium
batteries.
Two recent judicial decisions rejected claims that these Customs
regulations are inconsistent with section 526. Vivitar Corp. v. United
States21 was a declaratory judgment action by Vivitar (Vivitar US), a
California corporation. Vivitar US licensed foreign firms to manu-
facture photographic items using the Vivitar trademark; the foreign
firms then sold the items to the wholly owned foreign subsidiaries of
Vivitar US, which marketed the items outside the United States. The
United States Court of International Trade, in a decision affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, held that
customs regulations permitting sales within the United States of Viv-
itar trademarked products marketed by its foreign subsidiaries were
not unreasonable interpretations of section 526.22
Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
16 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
17 Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), afd, 761
F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
18 The President also stated there should be no change in U.S. policy until the Cabi-
net Committee on Commerce and Trade had completed its analysis of the issue, including
a review of data submitted by the public pursuant to a request by the Customs Service and
the Patent and Trademark Office. 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984) (extended at 49 Fed. Reg.
29,509 (1984)).
19 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)(2) (1985).
20 Id. "Common ownership or control" is illustrated by two recent cases, Bell &
Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), and Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Both cases involved the efforts by Osawa & Co. (Osawa), a U.S. corn-
pany, to prevent other companies from handling Mamiya cameras. Mamiya cameras are
made in Japan by a Japanese company, Mamiya Camera Co. (Mamiya), which owns the
Japanese trademark. J. Osawa & Co. (Osawa Japan) owns 3% of Mamiya's stock. Osawa
Japan and Mamiya agreed that Osawa Japan is the exclusive distributor for Mamiya cam-
eras outside Japan. Osawa Japan owned all of the stock of Osawa & Co. (USA), which in
turn owns 93% of Osawa's stock. OsawaJapan and Osawa agreed that Osawa is the exclu-
sive distributor in the U.S. for Mamiya cameras and Osawa owned the U.S. Mamiya trade-
mark. Customs determined there is no common ownership or control between Mamiya
and Osawa and banned imports of Mamiya cameras by firms other than Osawa. See also 49
Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1984).
21 593 F. Supp. at 420.
22 Id. at 434-36.
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States23 was a declaratory judgment action by a group of U.S. corpo-
rations that owned trademarks registered in the United States and
licensed foreign firms to manufacture goods such as fragrances and
cosmetics, watches, tires, fine crystal, cameras, photographic equip-
ment, binoculars, and electronic goods using those trademarks. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that
Customs regulations allowing sales within the United States of prod-
ucts manufactured by the foreign licensee and bearing, without au-
thorization, the registered U.S. trademark were consistent with
section 526.24
These two decisions summarize a century ofjudicial, legislative,
and administrative grappling with the importation of items made in
foreign countries and bearing the same trademark as an item sold in
the United States pursuant to authorization by owners of the U.S.
trademark.
II. Legislative and Judicial History
The first U.S. statute2 5 dealing with the grey market issue pro-
hibited importation of foreign merchandise that "copied or simu-
lated" a domestic trademark. This provision was reenacted in
section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905.26
In Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening2 7 the exclusive U.S. agent of a
German manufacturer of violin strings, which had registered the
manufacturer's trademark in the United States, sought to prevent an-
other firm from importing into the United States violin strings
purchased abroad from the German manufacturer. The court held
that section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905 did not apply because
the chief purpose of the section was to protect the public from arti-
cles "which are not genuine." 28
Five years later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
a similar claim in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.29 A. Bourjois Co., a U.S.
firm, purchased from a French manufacturer of face powder the
manufacturer's U.S. business, including the trademark "Java." Bour-
jois bought the face powder in France, repackaged the powder, and
sold it in the United States under the "Java" trademark. Bourjois
brought suit to stop another company from buying the same face
powder in France and selling it in the United States in the original
23 598 F. Supp. at 844.
24 Id. at 851-52.
25 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 75, 16 Stat. 580.
')6 Trademark Act of 1905, § 27, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1224
(1982)).
27 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
28 Id. at 782.
21) 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
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French package.30 The court rejected Bourjois' claims and refused
to certify the question to the Supreme Court.3 '
Congress reacted to Katzel by enacting section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1922.32 The legislative history of the Act indicates that Con-
gress intended the section to overrule Katzel.33 Senator McCumber,
one of the amendment's sponsors, stated that its purpose was to pro-
tect U.S. firms that had purchased trademarks from foreigners, but it
did not protect the U.S. agent of a foreign manufacturer from com-
peting imports. 34 Congressional debate did not mention Gretsch.35
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court deci-
sion in Katzel holding that the Trademark Act of 1905 did apply. 36
The Court said that plaintiff's trademark "was sold and could only be
sold with the good will of the business that the plaintiff bought." 37
Thus, the Trademark Act was designed, in part, to protect plaintiff's
investment in the goodwill of the business. 38
The implications of Katzel are illuminated by Prestonettes v. Coty, 39
decided the following year. In Prestonettes the Supreme Court held
that Coty, the French owner of a U.S. trademark, was not entitled to
an injunction prohibiting Prestonettes, a U.S. firm, from buying
Coty's perfumes and toilet powders in Europe and repacking them
for sale in the United States. Injunctive relief was denied because
Prestonettes' label clearly indicated that Prestonettes was not con-
nected with Coty and had repacked Coty's products. 40 The Court
distinguished Katzel by stating that Prestonettes' label would ensure
that "the public ... is likely to find ... out" if Prestonettes' product
is inferior to Coty's.4 1
Thus, by 1924 the Supreme Court had identified two factors to
be weighed in deciding whether to restrict competition by barring
grey market imports: reducing consumer confusion and protecting
the firms' goodwill investment. The law barred transshipments of
merchandise manufactured in a foreign country bearing an author-
ized trademark if a U.S. firm had purchased, in an arms length trans-
action, the right to be the exclusive U.S. distributor and to own the
U.S. trademark. The law did not bar transshipments of foreign mer-
chandise bearing an authorized trademark if the U.S. distributor and
30 Id. at 540.
31 Id. at 544.
32 Ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 975 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
'3 H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
34 62 CONG. REG. 11,604 (1922).
35 Id.
M! Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
37 Id. at 692. See also A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam).
38 See Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
39 Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 369.
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owner of the U.S. trademark was financially related to the foreign
manufacturer. 42
Efforts to control grey market imports might be viewed by some
as an attempt by manufacturers or their exclusive U.S. distributors to
protect "monopoly" profits rather than an endeavor to preserve
manufacturer and distributor "goodwill." It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the Department of Justice has periodically become involved
in the issue of grey market imports. Given the complexity of the
problem, it is also not surprising that the Justice Department's posi-
tion has vacillated.
In United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 43 the Government alleged that
each of three defendant U.S. corporations had violated section 2 of
the Sherman Act 44 by registering the trademark of French toilet
goods with the United States Treasury, in an attempt to prevent the
importation of the French toilet goods by others. The Government
prevailed in the district court, and the defendants appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Government then asked the Supreme Court to
vacate the judgment and remand so that the complaint could be dis-
missed.45 The Government advised the district court that the Execu-
tive Branch had decided that any possible conflict between the
Sherman Act and section 526 was better resolved through
legislation.46
In 1983 the Justice Department filed an amicus brief on behalf of
Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. in Bell & Howell.- Mamiya v. Masel Supply
Co. ,47 maintaining there was no conflict between a ban on grey mar-
ket imports of cameras and federal antitrust policies.48 Two years
later the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice filed com-
ments with the Department of Transportation on the question of a
proposed rule to require that original manufacturers of foreign vehi-
cles put a numerical stamp on certain parts of the car. While agree-
ing that the rule would reduce the number of cars stolen, the Justice
Department suggested that importers, as well as original manufac-
42 An earlier analysis of this topic, urging Congress to reconsider the wisdom of sec-
tion 526, apparently did not consider that section 562 did not bar transshipments when
the U.S. trademarks and the foreign trademark were owned by related companies. Dam,
Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the Bureau of Customs, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 45, 48 n.14, 49
(1964).
43 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. jurisd, noted sub norm Lanvin, Parfims, Inc. v.
United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, vacated and remanded sub non. Guer-
lain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
44 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
4. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, Parfums Corday, Inc. v. United States, and Lanvin
Parfums, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958) (consolidated cases dismissed).
4"' Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (on remand.
motion to dismiss granted).
47 719 F.2d at 42.
48 Brief for United States of America, Amicus Curiae at 16, Bell & Howell: Mamiya
Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
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turers, be permitted to mark major parts so that the grey market in
automobiles could be maintained. 49
III. Economic Analysis
In the domestic context, some consumers benefit, while others
are hurt, by price discrimination. 50 There is no a priori effect of price
discrimination on total output and hence on the "average" con-
sumer.5 1 Congress, perhaps conscious of these mixed effects, made
price discrimination illegal only when the effect "may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent competition. ' 5 2 The
Department of Justice recently said that "price discrimination has
ambiguous or unpredictable welfare effects." 5 3
In the international context, appreciation of the dollar relative
to other currencies 54 makes international transshipments more prof-
itable to foreign exporters and domestic importers by increasing the
difference between the prices of products in the United States and
the prices of the same products in foreign countries. 55 Prohibitions
of or limitations on grey market imports result in an international
price discrimination that is distinguishable in effect from domestic
49 Comments of U.S. Justice Dep't to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Performance
Standards and Criteria for Selection of Covered Vehicles and Replacement Parts-Motor
Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984, Docket No. T84-01 (June 14, 1985).
50 "Price discrimination occurs when the same commodity is sold at more than one
price, or when similar products are sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal
costs." E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs: THEORY AND APPLICATION 308 (4th ed. 1982).
51 P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 45 (1965).
52 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
53 Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Guidelines]. The Guidelines have been sharply criticized, but not on this particular point,
as being "inconsistent with existing law and demonstrably unsound as a matter of policy."
H.R. REP. No. 113, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1985).
.54 Between 1980 and 1984 the U.S. dollar appreciated by 58% relative to the
weighted average of our major trading partners. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
1985, H.R. DOC. No. 19, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 351.
.5 A simple example illustrates this point. Consider a French firm manufacturing an
item in France for five francs per unit and selling it in France at eight francs per unit.
Assume the firm incurs selling costs in the United States of one dollar per unit and faces a
downward sloping demand curve, given byp = 10-q/2, in which p is the dollar price in the
United States and q is the quantity sold in the United States. Assume also that the firm
believes that the price in France is independent of the price in the United States and that
the firm wishes to maximize the profit (measured in francs) it makes on its U.S. sales.
Finally, assume the current exchange rate is one dollar equals one franc. Profit on sales in
the United States equals 10q-q2/2-q-5q. Using the formula, the result is that the profit-
maximizing price in the United States is eight dollars from the sale of four units. Because
the price in France is also eight dollars, there will be no transshipments. Now assume the
exchange rate becomes one dollar equals two francs. The price in France becomes four
dollars, and the firm's profit on sales in the United States (measured in francs) becomes
profit equal to 20q-q2-2q-5q. The profit maximizing price is now $6.75 from the sale of'6.5
units in the United States. Because of the change in the rate of exchange, the difference
between the U.S. price and the French price has grown to $2.75, which might induce
transshipments.
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price discrimination on domestic consumers. When economic incen-
tives to international transshipments exist, foreclosure of U.S. mar-
kets by means of U.S. customs law results in higher product costs to
domestic consumers. Thus, unlike domestic price discrimination, in-
ternational price discrimination injures all U.S. consumers.
Those who wish to ban grey market imports argue that such a
ban would help solve the "free-rider" problem associated with cer-
tain products. To establish a market for its products, a manufac-
turer, distributor, or retailer must often provide product information
to the consumer. Such information is disseminated at no cost to the
consumer by a variety of means, including national advertising and
retail sales promotions. Other distributors and retailers who have
not invested in trademark development can offer trademarked prod-
ucts at lower prices, thereby receiving a "free ride." The inability of
the firm initially providing the information to consumers to charge
directly for that information can result in too little information being
supplied and hence, too little consumption of the good. Forcing all
consumers to pay for the information, by charging a higher price for
the good, however, may also lead to too little consumption, because
consumers who do not need the information may be deterred from
buying the higher priced product. Thus, the net welfare effects on
consumers of preventing "free-riding" are ambiguous in the absence
of empirical information. 56
IV. Recent Legislation
Congress has vacillated between protecting firms from the
"free-riding" of others and letting consumers buy from firms that
offer lower prices and less services. In 1937 Congress passed the
Miller-Tydings Act 57 to exempt state "fair trade" laws, permitting a
manufacturer to enter into an agreement with a distributor stipulat-
ing the minimum price at which the distributor would sell the prod-
uct, from the Sherman Antitrust Act. In 1952 the McGuire Act 5 8
extended the privity of state "fair-trade" contracts to "non-signer"
distributors. 5 9 In 1975, however, Congress passed the Consumer
55 See Novos & Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytical Ap-
proach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 236 (1984); Hirshleifler & Riley, The Analytics of Uhncertainty and
Information-An Expository Survey, 17J. ECON. LIT. 1375, 1403-06 (1979). Cf P. SAMUELSON,
FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 42 (1965) (absent empirical information, no pre-
sumption is possible about effects of advertising, as compared to no advertising, on output
and price). One economist claims "the empirical significance [of free-riding] appears
modest." F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 593
(1980).
57 Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
58 Pub. L. No. 542, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952).
51) Nothing contained in this Act or any of the Antitrust Acts shall render un-
lawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right of action created by any
statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully and
1986]
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Goods Pricing Act, 60 which repealed both the Miller-Tydings Act
and the McGuire Act, again making agreements to set minimum
prices illegal under the Sherman Act. Congress noted that the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Department of Justice supported re-
peal and that "[o]pponents [of repeal] were primarily service-
oriented manufacturers who claimed retailers would not give ade-
quate service unless they were guaranteed a good margin of
profit."'6 1 In 1984 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2320,62 which im-
poses criminal sanctions on persons importing goods with a counter-
feit trademark. Congress indicated that this new statute did not
apply to grey market imports and "is not intended to be used ... to
facilitate or enforce any system of resale price maintenance. ' 6 3
For the last decade, therefore, Congress has decided that firms
whose products are subject to "free-riding" must be their own po-
licemen. 64 Neither state nor federal officials will enforce efforts by a
domestic manufacturer to have its product sold above a uniform
minimum price within the United States. 65 The Government could,
of course, require sellers of grey market goods to tell consumers
which, if any, U.S. warranties apply. New York has recently passed
such legislation.6 6
V. Conclusion
As a result of the repeal of domestic fair trade laws, U.S. law now
favors the foreign over the domestic manufacturer when the foreign
knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than
the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the per-
son so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such a contract or
agreement, is unfair competition and is hereby actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby.
Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
60 Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
61 S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1569, 1571. The principal fair traded products were stereo components,
television sets, major appliances, mattresses, toiletries, kitchenware, watches, jewelry,
glassware, wallpaper, bicycles, some types of clothing, liquor, and prescription drugs. Id.
Some of these products, such as toiletries and watches, are among those now involved in
grey market" imports.
452 Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-547, § 204(a), 98 Stat. 2770
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2320).
63 S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 449.
64 See, e.g', Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (en-
joining Weinstein from selling watches in the United States that he buys in Europe unless
he makes it clear they are not guaranteed by Omega Watch Company and makes no false
description or representation about any, watch purporting to be an Omega watch).
65 A U.S. manufacturer cannot bring a trademark infringement action against some-
one who buys an item in a low price area of the United States and sells it in a high price
area of the United States. Dam, supra note 42, at 48. l)am wrote when stale fair trade laws
were still legal and did not discuss the consequences of their repeal.
('( Assembly Bill No. 5971 (effective Oct. 22, 1985). See also N.Y. Times, Jtne 22,
1985, at 52, col. 1.
MANUFACTURING LOCATION
manufacturer seeks to have a uniform minimum price within the
United States. For example, consider firms A, B, and C, each making
widgets with a separate trademark. Firm A manufactures widgets
bearing its trademark in the United States and sells in both the
United States and France. Firm B manufactures widgets bearing its
trademark in France and sells in both France and the United States.
Firm C manufactures widgets in both the United States and France.
U.S. and French trademarks for firms B and C are owned by finan-
cially separate entities. Firms A, B, and C each try to set a uniform
minimum price in the United States that is higher than the price in
France. Suppose a U.S. retailer buys A's widgets, B's widgets, and
C's widgets in France and sells them in the United States below the
price exclusive U.S. distributors seek to maintain. While firm B's
U.S. distributor and firm C's U.S. distributor can each invoke the
Customs regulations 67 and cease unauthorized imports, firm A and
its U.S. distributor now have no remedy under U.S. law.
In the 1920s Congress was protectionist. It is doubtful that the
Congress that originally passed section 526 in 1922 intended to
favor foreign manufacturers over U.S. manufacturers. The Tariff Act
of 1922, which raised tariffs, was based on a belief that "the quota-
tions made by foreign producers for export sale of late have been so
extremely low that they threaten the destruction of American indus-
tries and have consequently demoralized American trade." '68
It may be that the Congress that enacted section 526 in 1922
believed that a U.S. purchaser of a foreign trademark would be un-
able to obtain effective relief in foreign courts against a foreign seller
who breached its contract with the U.S. purchaser. The develop-
ment of international mechanisms for resolving international busi-
ness disputes, 69 however, suggests that this rationale should no
longer have much weight.70
In conclusion, there is no reason to think that "free-riding" is a
67 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985).
68 S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922).
('9 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985) (Arbitration Act and Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards require arbitration in Japan of antitrust counterclaim by Puerto Rican cor-
poration againstJapanese corporation); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(U.S. company must submit to foreign arbitration its claim that a German citizen residing
in Switzerland violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when he sold certain compa-
nies and trademarks to U.S. company). For a comprehensive treatment of litsubishi and
the Arbitration Act, see McClendon, Subject-Maltter Arbitrability in International Cases: 11itsub-
ishi Ators Closes the Circle, II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. (1986).
70 While there were historical reasons for limiting section 526 protection to U.S.
firms purchasing their trademarks in an arms length transaction, there is little current jus-
tification for treating independent U.S. distributors differently from those owned by for-
eign firms. Occasionally independent distributors may be more efficient than a subsidiary;
sometimes a firm may use both systems in the same market. Guidelines, supra note 53, at
§ 2.2. A wholly owned distributor may, however, make it easier for the foreign manufac-
turer to capture all the profits earned in the United States. By favoring individual distribu-
1986]
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more serious problem for imported goods than for items manufac-
tured solely in the United States. The original justification for sec-
tion 526 having receded and with unforeseen effects now visible,
Congress, having made state fair trade laws illegal, should reconsider
the wisdom of section 526.
tors, section 526 reduces the adverse effects of price discrimination on the domestic
economy.
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